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About this publication 
 
The sustainability of programs supported by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria will be one of the most important issues in global health over 
the next several years. Once programs end, who or what will be responsible for taking 
over—and expanding, as needed—the projects and initiatives launched through the 
Global Fund? Will crucial services such as HIV treatment continue to be delivered to 
those in need? Will momentum be lost because of capacity, skills, and financial 
constraints at national and local levels? 
 
Such questions are already being addressed in a handful of countries. One of those 
nations is Estonia, where the country’s sole Global Fund program, which helped ramp up 
HIV/AIDS services, ended in October 2007. This publication examines developments 
prior to and following the program’s end, including steps taken by the government and 
civil society in regards to HIV/AIDS funding and responsibilities in the future. It focuses 
particularly on availability and uptake of antiretroviral treatment (ART), the cornerstone 
of efforts to achieve universal treatment access for people living with HIV around the 
world. 
 
All national and local contexts differ of course. However, the observations from and 
lessons learned in Estonia may prove instructive to stakeholders across the spectrum in 
other countries where such transitions must eventually take place. One overall message 
should be clear: it is never too early to start thinking about these things, especially for 
civil society advocates. Ensuring commitment to the sustainability and, ultimately, 
expansion of vital care and support initiatives has not been a simple task even in a 
relatively wealthy and stable country such as Estonia.  
 
Preparation and methodology. The primary author of this report was Jeff Hoover; it was 
commissioned and supported by the Open Society Institute (OSI). Research centered on a 
review of relevant documents and interviews in Estonia in late April 2008. Those 
interviewed included government officials, representatives from civil society 
organizations involved in the HIV/AIDS response, and people living with HIV. Citations 
throughout the report point to sources of information and observations.  
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Acronyms and abbreviations 
 
AIDS =  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
ART =  antiretroviral treatment 
ARV =  antiretroviral 
CCM =  Country Coordinating Mechanism 
EHPV =  Estonian Network of People Living with HIV 
Global Fund = Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
HIV =   human immunodeficiency virus 
IDU =   injecting drug user 
MoSA =  Ministry of Social Affairs  
NGO =  nongovernmental organization 
NIHD =  National Institute for Health Development  
PLHA =  people living with HIV and AIDS 
TB =   tuberculosis 
UNAIDS =  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
VCT =  voluntary counseling and testing 
WHO =  World Health Organization 
 
 
Note on text: 
Unless specified otherwise, all figures marked by “$” are U.S. dollar amounts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Global Fund’s worldwide impact and sustainability issues  
 
In less than seven years of existence, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria has become one of the world’s largest sources of health-related assistance, both 
in terms of scope and distributed resources. As of May 2008, as it was awaiting proposals 
for its eighth round of funding, the Global Fund had approved more than 500 grants 
around the world totaling some $10.74 billion. At least 120 countries had benefited 
directly from at least one grant (including multi-country regional grants), with several 
having successfully applied multiple times.1  
 
The Global Fund describes itself as a financing mechanism, not a program administrator. 
It therefore relies on projects and programs to be developed, implemented, monitored, 
and evaluated by national stakeholders. Such institutional flexibility is the main reason 
that individual grants vary in size from more than $150 million to less than $5 million 
depending on a country’s population, the disease(s) for which funds are requested, 
proposals’ intended outcomes, and how and through which entities resources are 
distributed and services implemented.  
 
Some policies and regulations are universal and relatively detailed, however. The Global 
Fund’s guidelines contain specific reporting requirements, for example, and the 
maximum duration of every single grant is five years. Thus, although the vast majority of 
the hundreds of Global Fund programs around the world have yet to conclude, they will 
all eventually end. In some countries and contexts, Global Fund assistance will continue 
through different programs initiated in other funding rounds. Even in such cases, 
however, the differences in each program in terms of scope, focus and approved funding 
mean that adjustments will need to be made in service delivery at the national and local 
levels.  
 
The key point is that Global Fund programs are not indefinite, regardless of local needs. 
Moreover, even existing programs could face resource constraints should donors to the 
Global Fund itself reduce their support or fail to honor pledges. That possibility is not so 
far-fetched in a world where economic downturns can strike with little warning and 
governments of wealthy nations regularly face domestic pressure to limit foreign aid.  
 
Whether anticipated or sudden, the end or sharp reduction in Global Fund support could 
have dire consequences—especially in developing countries with relatively high burdens 
of HIV, TB, and malaria, three of the world’s most debilitating and deadly diseases. 
Global Fund assistance has improved the health and well-being of millions of people who 
otherwise might be dead or severely ill. The ripple effects of reduced sickness and 
morbidity on families, communities, and entire societies are equally profound.  
 
                                                 
1 Regularly updated information about the Global Fund, including all individual grants, is available online 
at its own website (www.theglobalfund.org) and that of Aidspan (www.aidspan.org), an independent 
watchdog and supporting organization. 
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Although the Global Fund is not the only provider of essential resources in these nations, 
it has been a vital one in many. Its involvement has been particularly extensive in 
developing and expanding HIV/AIDS service delivery, which is not entirely surprising 
given that two thirds of the grant funds allocated to date have been through its HIV/AIDS 
component. Among other things, the more than $6 billion allocated through that 
component have supported  
• the scale-up in more than 100 countries of antiretroviral treatment (ART) access; 
• the roll-out of HIV prevention and education campaigns and associated materials 
(such as condoms); and  
• anti-stigma initiatives designed and led by community groups and people living 
with HIV.  
 
Sustaining the programs initiated through the Global Fund is therefore of crucial interest 
to those benefiting, directly or indirectly, from its assistance. Such programs can be 
costly, though, especially for poorer nations that in many cases have the greatest needs. 
They can also be difficult to administer and monitor effectively because of human 
capacity constraints. Some of the gaps can likely be addressed by other aid sources, 
including bilateral and multilateral agencies. However, in many cases responsibility for 
sustaining Global Fund programs—and expanding them, if and when needs arise—will 
rest primarily with national stakeholders: government agencies and domestic healthcare 
providers, local civil society, and the private sector.  
 
Adequately preparing for and managing post–Global Fund transitions will be stern tests 
of societies’ commitment to build on important health-related achievements. As they 
move forward, those involved will need to make fundamental and difficult decisions in 
terms of how scarce resources are allocated and utilized throughout society. They should 
consider it an ongoing priority to understand and learn lessons from developments in 
other countries that have faced or are facing similar challenges. The contexts will never 
be the same, but the ultimate goals should be. Ideally, they are to  
1. sustain levels of service achieved by Global Fund programs by their official end, 
and  
2. expand the reach of those services as part of an effort to achieve universal access, 
especially for life-prolonging treatment and care. 
 
Those two goals sound reasonable from just about any perspective—yet it is not as easy 
to achieve such goals as to recognize that they are priorities. That is why careful and 
ongoing consideration of developments elsewhere can be helpful.  
 
1.2 Estonia as a post–Global Fund example 
 
The list of potentially useful Global Fund transition examples is limited to date: as of 
May 2008, few countries had reached the point where all Global Fund programs had 
ended.  
 
Estonia is one country that can properly be considered to have “graduated” beyond the 
Global Fund. At first glance, Estonia is not a nation that would appear to have much in 
5 
common with other Global Fund recipients. It has just 1.3 million people; is relatively 
wealthy and politically stable; is a member of the European Union; and is home to 
perhaps 10,000 people living with HIV at most. The conditions are worse and the needs 
greater in just about every other recipient nation. 
 
Yet Estonian government authorities, supported by civil society, nonetheless felt the need 
more than five years ago to apply for Global Fund assistance and to rely on it to build 
what policymakers hope will be a viable, effective, and sustainable AIDS response. That 
objective is shared by every nation engaging with the Global Fund, regardless of the 
specific contexts. 
 
Equally important and instructive is the fact that the end of the Global Fund program in 
Estonia was not seamless and uncomplicated, despite the country’s comparatively 
favorable social, economic, and political factors. Government and civil society 
stakeholders had, and continue to have, different perceptions of the quality of service 
delivery over the years. They also are not equally confident in regards to the 
sustainability of HIV prevention and treatment programs initiated through the Global 
Fund.  
 
Such differences will undoubtedly arise in every country and context where the Global 
Fund operates, and they are likely to be particularly noteworthy in regards to access to 
HIV treatment services. Determined advocates around the world continue to press 
governments and funding entities to make universal access to ART not just a pledge, but 
a reality. Some 3 million people were on ART by April 2008, but even that number 
represents less than half of those thought to be in need. 
 
Some observers assert that universal access is neither achievable nor sustainable from any 
perspective; most of them argue that resources should be focused primarily on 
prevention. That view is refuted not only by most advocates, but by the Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund itself. They contend 
that prevention and treatment are inextricably linked within a comprehensive and 
ultimately effective AIDS response paradigm based on the following belief: increased 
access to ART is a humane and compassionate approach that can also have important 
impacts on HIV prevention efforts. As such, it should be a major priority of all funders, 
including the Global Fund, and all governments and service providers engaged in AIDS 
responses. 
 
Most stakeholders in Estonia accept the importance of ART access and uptake and have 
made it a post–Global Fund priority; so too will their counterparts in other countries in 
the future. Therefore, this early observation of key HIV treatment issues in Estonia is 
likely to prove instructive and insightful. This report considers some of the main issues 
raised by stakeholders in Estonia and offers recommendations designed to improve and 
smooth processes elsewhere. 
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2. Country-specific background information 
 
2.1 Overview of Estonia’s HIV epidemic 
 
Estonia regained its independence less than two decades ago when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. Not only does it have the smallest population of the former Soviet republics 
(1.3 million people), but it is also the richest—a distinction it held throughout most of the 
Soviet era. The country has barely paused during the early years of transition. Economic 
growth over the past decade has been among the highest in Europe, although the first 
signs of a sudden and largely unexpected slowdown were noted in early 2008. 
 
Wealth is of course relative, and Estonia has far to go before catching up to most other 
countries in the European Union, which it joined in 2004. Pockets of poverty remain, 
especially among the ethnic-Russian community. Native Russian speakers comprise a 
significant minority, more than 25 percent of the population, and are concentrated in 
Tallinn, the capital, and the northeastern part of the country.  
 
Ethnic Russians have also been disproportionately affected by HIV. The epidemic caught 
the country off guard when it first became apparent in the late 1990s among injecting 
drug users (IDUs) in and around the city of Narva, in the northeast. The cumulative 
number of registered HIV cases totaled less than 100 before 1999, but 390 new cases 
were registered in the following year alone.2 That number more than tripled in 2001, 
when 1,474 new cases were registered. The sudden surge prompted the then-minister of 
social affairs to declare a “concentrated epidemic” and begin to consider more 
comprehensive strategies to respond to the crisis.3 
 
As it turned out, 2001 was the peak year in terms of new registered cases. The number 
declined over the next few years before leveling off at about 700 new cases per year. The 
Estonian Health Protection Inspectorate reported 633 newly registered cases in 2007,4 
which brought the cumulative official total to 6,364 cases. However, UNAIDS estimates 
that the real number of cases in Estonia may be higher than 10,000.5 Still, most nations 
with HIV epidemics would gladly trade their case burdens with either estimate. Yet it is a 
significant and worrisome statistic in such a small country. With adult HIV prevalence 
above 1 percent, Estonia has one of the highest HIV rates in Europe (surpassed only by 
Ukraine and, perhaps, Russia). Its rate of new diagnoses continues to lead Europe.6 The 
                                                 
2 From Estonia progress report to UNAIDS, 2008. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/Estonia_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
3 Lizette Alvarez, “HIV surge catches tradition-bound Estonia off guard,” New York Times, February 15, 
2004.  
4 From Estonia progress report to UNAIDS, 2008. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/Estonia_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
5 From Estonia progress report to UNAIDS, 2008. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/Estonia_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
6 As cited by the World Health Organization, “Evaluation of Fighting HIV/AIDS in Estonia,” April 2008. 
www.euro.who.int/Document/E91264.pdf. 
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problem will be around a long time as well, given that individuals between 15 and 24 
years of age comprise 80 percent of the newly diagnosed.  
 
The epidemic has devastated the drug using community. Far more than half of those 
diagnosed to date contracted HIV through contaminated injection material; one survey 
from 2005 estimated that more than 60 percent of 13,800 IDUs in Estonia were HIV-
positive.7 However, IDUs’ share of officially registered cases is declining, falling over 
time from 90 percent of those diagnosed in 2001 to less than 50 percent each year after 
2004.8  
 
2.2 Basics about HIV treatment policies and uptake 
 
The National Institute for Health Development (NIHD) oversees the Estonian 
government’s AIDS response, including the direct implementation of policy decisions 
and programs. A division of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), NIHD was 
established in 2003—not coincidentally the year the Global Fund program started (see 
Box A).  
 
NIHD’s HIV treatment structure calls for individuals who test positive for HIV to be 
referred to infectious-disease specialists. Those specialists, who currently consult with 
patients in five cities, supervise all aspects of healthcare provided to PLHA, including the 
provision and monitoring of ART.  
 
About 95 percent of all Estonians have health insurance, which is paid for through a state 
fund (the Estonian Health Insurance Fund) financed by a 13 percent levy on salaries. All 
employed individuals and pregnant women are automatically insured under that system 
and receive most healthcare services free of charge above and beyond quarterly fees of 50 
Estonian kroons ($5). Additional fees, usually no more than 50 kroons, are levied for 
certain “special” services, including9: 
• home visits by primary practitioners; 
• consultations with providers of specialized medical care; 
• hospital stays; 
• dental care (for adults); and 
• medicines purchased in pharmacies.  
 
The 5 percent or so of the population who are not covered through this fund often fall 
through the cracks, however. Generally speaking, the only subsidized or free services for 
them are emergency medical services. Special provisions cover uninsured individuals 
with certain conditions, including HIV and TB. Provisions for PLHA are built into the 
government’s national HIV/AIDS program (see Box A). Most notably, HIV-positive 
                                                 
7 From Estonia progress report to UNAIDS, 2008. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/Estonia_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
8 National Institute of Health Development, “Estonian Program of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria,” December 2007. 
9 The Estonian Health Insurance Fund’s compensation levels differ depending on factors such as age and 
income. Patients’ fees for these “special” services may therefore differ as well. 
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individuals can receive health care (including ART) free of charge in the public sector—
with all fees waived—even if they are not employed. One major exception is that 
treatment for hepatitis C, a condition common among IDUs, is not available free of 
charge to those not enrolled in the insurance fund. 
 
Box A 
 
THE NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES’ ROLES 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
The Estonian government’s HIV/AIDS response is spearheaded by the National Institute for Health 
Development (NIHD), a division of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) that was established in 2003. 
Although the institute’s overall objective, as per its website, is “the ongoing development of health and 
continuing improvement of the quality of life of the Estonian population,” NIHD also has specific and 
important responsibilities regarding HIV/AIDS. In particular, it is charged with implementing and 
overseeing key health-related strategies and programs, including the government’s National HIV/AIDS 
Prevention Strategy 2006–2015. In that role, it is “responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of all 
prevention activities and [developing] minimum standards for different services.” It is supposed to 
coordinate these activities with “executive partners” including “the Ministries of Internal Affairs, 
Education, Justice and Defense.” 
 
The current national strategy replaced one introduced by MoSA in 2002. The new one was developed in 
2005 as part of an effort to better coordinate and integrate other governmental agencies, as well as civil 
society and the private sector, in the HIV/AIDS response. Also established that year was a multisectoral 
Governmental Commission on HIV/AIDS as an advisory body to the government for the central 
coordination of the implementation of the new strategy. 
 
The current national strategy outlines responsibilities across government. Each implementing ministry 
is required to develop an annual action plan and budget for its HIV/AIDS activities; both the budget and 
plan must be submitted to the Commission for approval. The following are among the ministries 
involved (followed by their responsibilities): 
• Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA): HIV prevention, treatment and care among the general 
population 
• Ministry of Education: HIV prevention in schools and among youth; health education 
• Ministry of Justice: HIV prevention, treatment and care in prisons 
• Ministry of Interior: “prevention of vocational hazards” among police and disaster 
management agencies 
• Ministry of Defense: VCT among army recruits 
• Ministry of Population: focus on Russian-speaking youth through the Non-Estonians’ 
Integration Foundation 
 
When the Global Fund program was operating, its CCM was directly responsible for Global Fund 
implementation and monitoring activities. The CCM was disbanded after the program ended, however, 
leaving the Governmental Commission on HIV/AIDS as the sole national-level policymaking body. 
Civil society and the private sector are represented on the Commission (as they were on the CCM). 
ART was first provided in 2001 and just 100 people were receiving it in 2003, when the 
Global Fund program began. An NIHD representative said her “best estimate” was that 
“700 to 800” people were on ART in April 2008.10 
                                                 
10 Interview with Annike Veimer, director of public health programs at NIHD, in Tallinn (April 21, 2008). 
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3. The Global Fund program in Estonia 
 
The explosion in HIV cases in Estonia occurred at the same time the Global Fund was 
launched and issued its first calls for proposals. Government officials created a Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) and decided to apply for two main reasons: i) they 
wanted help establishing viable prevention and treatment strategies and programs, and ii) 
they were concerned about potentially burgeoning HIV-related costs. The original 
application, prepared in 2002, was quite explicit in laying out the problems and 
concerns11:   
 
Estonia has the most rapidly spreading HIV epidemic in Europe. The 
country is responding vigorously but needs significant and immediate 
external investment if it is to respond as rapidly and effectively as 
possible. Estonia faces an HIV epidemic spreading at 10 times the rate in 
most Western European countries, yet has less than a third of the 
resources available to respond.  
 
The CCM’s proposal, titled “Scaling Up the Response to HIV in Estonia,” was approved 
in the second round of Global Fund grants. The program officially started on October 1, 
2003 and ended four years later.12 The principal recipient of the grant was NIHD, a 
department within MoSA that was created the year the grant began. More than $10 
million was requested over the grant’s lifetime; in the end, a total of $10.49 million was 
disbursed through the Global Fund program. 
 
The approved proposal called for the implementation of programs with three main 
components: prevention work with young people; treatment and care for PLHA; and 
targeted interventions for high-risk communities such as IDUs, sex workers, prisoners, 
and men who have sex with men (MSM). In terms of HIV treatment, the key objective 
was “to improve the quality of life of people living with HIV/AIDS by improving access 
to social support and health care.”13  
 
The original application also highlighted the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach 
that included civil society. The CCM exceeded Global Fund recommendations regarding 
inclusiveness: half of its members were not from the public sector.  
 
Government officials claimed from the very beginning that the grant was intended 
primarily to support their financial and programmatic scale-up efforts, not to cover them 
altogether. According to a recent government report, for example14:  
 
                                                 
11 The original application is in PDF format on the Global Fund’s website: 
Estonia_application_2ESTH_85_189_full.pdf. 
12 Estonia’s Global Fund program ran for only four years, one year less than the standard five-year 
program.   
13 See Estonia_application_2ESTH_85_189_full.pdf 
14 From Estonia progress report to UNAIDS, 2008. 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/Estonia_2008_country_progress_report_en.pdf. 
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The condition for receiving the grant was that the Estonian government 
[would] not reduce the financing of HIV/AIDS prevention and [would] 
continue the implementation of the national HIV/AIDS program. Global 
Fund resources have enabled [the government] to expand considerably 
the evidence-based interventions and cover the expenses related to the 
increasing need of ARV drugs. 
 
Evaluations over the years of Estonia’s Global Fund program have been mostly positive. 
A grant scorecard from June 2005, halfway through the program’s term, rated it a 
“go”15—which means that evaluators recommended that all promised funding be 
disbursed. Of the 30 indicators evaluated, 24 had achieved “100% (or more) of target.” 
Objective 6, which covered ART access and monitoring, received a “very good 
performance” rating. 
 
That key objective was also examined in a May 2007 performance report.16 At that time, 
evaluators said the program had “achieved” its goals to date in terms of “100% reach of 
ART to those in need.” The report did note, however, that one key element of the 
objective was falling short: the number of uninsured PLHA who receive medical care 
(health monitoring). That gap, which remains a major challenge more than a year later, 
highlights stakeholders’ ongoing difficulty in identifying HIV-positive people and 
encouraging them to access health care in general.  
 
As noted in Section 2, the number of people on ART rose significantly over the course of 
the Global Fund program. In just three years, for example, the total increased from 116 
(late 2004) to 721 (September 2007).17 Of those, nearly three quarters (532 individuals, 
or 72 percent) were uninsured. The program also supported a major expansion in HIV
prevention, including targeted harm reduction interventions for IDUs (see Appendix 2). 
 
                                                
 
Most stakeholders, regardless of sector, express satisfaction with the results of the Global 
Fund program. According to Igor Sobolev, chairman of the Estonian Network of People 
Living with HIV (EHPV), a leading NGO sub-recipient, “The Global Fund was vital. It 
not only ramped up services, but helped create a viable, sustainable civil society. It raised 
our status and gave us the capacity to be better monitors, evaluators and advocates. Also, 
the Global Fund helped prompt better integration of health services by removing 
specialized AIDS centers.”18 
 
 
 
15 The scorecard is available in PDF format on the Global Fund website: 
June2005_scorecard_2ESTH_189_gsc.pdf. 
16 The performance report is available in PDF format on the Global Fund’s website: 
May2007_performance_report_2ESTH_189_gpr.pdf 
17 National Institute of Health Development, “Estonian Program of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria,” December 2007. 
18 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
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4. Challenges related to post–Global Fund transition 
 
The Global Fund program undoubtedly had a major impact and influence on the AIDS 
response in Estonia. However, the program did not occur in a vacuum. All stakeholders 
agreed from the beginning that it would be devastating from a public health 
perspective—as well as morally untenable, given the lifeline that had been thrown to 
hundreds of needy individuals—to eliminate or even scale back the projects and services 
initiated and expanded with Global Fund support. It was clear that sustaining the vital 
services, including ART provision, would be necessary after the Global Fund program 
ended.  
 
In Estonia, the obvious and logical option was for the government to assume 
responsibility by taking over the Global Fund program and funding it from its national 
budget. That option is also most likely, and preferable from capacity and continuity 
perspectives, in other countries—but especially so in Estonia. As noted by the former 
Global Fund program manager (and current NIHD staffperson), “Estonia is lucky because 
we’re relatively rich....The government can afford to add new funds to the overall budget 
to cover program costs and thus does not need to shift funds from elsewhere. Shifting 
funds would have been much more complicated and difficult because some ministries and 
officials would have resisted.”19 
 
Various Estonian government agencies and departments have subsequently been charged 
with funding and administering elements of the Global Fund program. In some cases this 
has entailed folding Global Fund projects into already established programs; in others the 
assumption of responsibility represents a completely new activity area for a ministry. 
  
Government policymakers have based their decisions and strategies on the National 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategy 2006–2015, the national plan first promulgated in 2005. 
Even with advance warning, however, the transition—which is properly seen as a multi-
year process that began far before the program ended and continues to this day, nearly a 
year after its end—has not been without challenges, complications, and criticisms.  
 
This section provides an overview of some notable perceptions, developments, and issues 
related to the transition. Most, but not all, are related to the core issue of this report: 
access to ART and related HIV treatment services for PLHA. Some were raised by the 
government itself, others by civil society. Each challenge area is followed by a brief 
discussion of responses taken (if any), outcomes, and potential meaning for the future.  
 
In some cases, observers and stakeholders disagree on the very facts and history of an 
issue. It is not possible to state who is right or wrong in such cases. The lack of clarity 
and differences in perception are themselves instructive, however, because they illustrate 
how difficult effective collaboration can be among committed stakeholders who represent 
diverse interests. Such “challenges around challenges” are likely to arise in most other 
countries and contexts. 
 
                                                 
19 Interview with Annike Veimer, director of public health programs at NIHD, in Tallinn (April 21, 2008). 
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4.1 Funding and budget support 
 
Funding represents the major challenge to Global Fund program sustainability from the 
government’s perspective. It may be true that the government can afford to allocate new 
funds to sustain and expand HIV/AIDS services provided through the program, but it 
may not always want or choose to. For one thing, ART provision is already expensive, 
and will become even more so as more people access treatment. The government’s ability 
to lower procurement costs is limited by EU patent-protection guidelines that all but 
prohibit the use of lower-priced generic ARVs.  
 
Funding crisis and successful public appeal 
 
In June 2007, the government announced that, contrary to previous statements, it could 
not afford to maintain the Global Fund program’s level of funding for HIV and AIDS 
programs. That announcement implied that funding for ART provision would be cut, 
thereby reducing the number of people with access to the vital medicines. 
  
The government’s statement galvanized local civil society. A coalition of NGOs 
organized a roundtable meeting for their sector’s stakeholders and drafted a public 
appeal, signed by 17 civil society groups, to submit to the government. The effort was 
international in scope: nearly 100 NGOs from 40 countries joined their Estonian 
counterparts in urging the government to reverse its decision. The widely circulated 
appeal called on the government to agree to commit to funding HIV/AIDS prevention 
and treatment programs at the same level for the first post–Global Fund year, and to 
recognize the need to increase the budget in subsequent years. (See Appendix 1 for the 
text of the appeal.) 
 
The civil society sector’s efforts were successful. In October 2007, the minister of social 
affairs agreed to not reduce funding for 2008. Two months later she also signed an 
agreement stating that a representative from the Estonian Network of People Living with 
HIV would be appointed to the government’s procurement commission. That request had 
been made by civil society advocates as well. 
 
Although HIV/AIDS funding in the 2008 budget was “saved,” similar moves to cut 
resources are likely to arise again in the future—perhaps even in the run-up to the 2009 
budget. In early 2008, Estonia began experiencing a major economic slowdown after 
nearly 10 years of rapid growth. In late April, the Ministry of Finance said the 
government had reached agreement “in principle” on spending cuts totaling 3.1 billion 
kroons ($310 million) from the state budget. In that announcement, individual ministries 
were warned that they may each need to cut at least 100 million kroons from their own 
budgets for that overall amount to be reached.20  
 
                                                 
20 BBJ News, “Estonian government reaches accord on budget cuts,” April 25. 2008.  
www.bbj.hu/news/news_38898_estonian%2Bgovernment%2Breaches%2Baccord%2Bon%2Bbudget%2Bc
uts.html   
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Civil society advocates have vowed to resist any cuts to HIV/AIDS programs, and they 
have an ally in NIHD. As of May 2008, it was unclear as to i) the total spending cuts (if 
any) the government would require; ii) each ministry’s required contribution; or iii) 
whether changes in funding levels for HIV/AIDS services in 2009 were being considered. 
 
Financial requirements for increased ART uptake  
 
Jarno Habicht, the head of WHO’s country office in Estonia and a former member of the 
CCM, stressed the fact that there is “no cap” on the number of people who can eventually 
be on ART in Estonia.21 “We expect treatment access to rise to between 2,000 and 3,000” 
in the next few years, he said, adding: 
 
It will take a huge financial commitment to afford this. And the expansion 
has other costs too. For example, there will be a need to increase funding 
for other services such as case management. Part of the solution is 
perhaps to get the private sector more involved. 
 
Gap from end of Global Fund program (September 30, 2007) to end of calendar year 
(December 31, 2007) 
 
Government policies require contracts to be on a calendar-year basis. That meant follow-
up contracts for service providers could not officially start until January 1, 2008. In an 
effort to prevent the suspension of delivery of key services, Global Fund program 
managers at NIHD decided to reserve some Global Fund monies to cover project costs 
through the end of 2007, a full three months after the program officially ended.  
 
4.2 Government’s level and extent of preparation 
 
Civil society perceptions  
 
Some civil society stakeholders interviewed in April 2008 said the government did not 
adequately prepare for the post–Global Fund transition. According to Igor Sobolev, 
EHPV’s chairman, the main underlying problem has been constant staff turnover within 
government agencies, a situation that contrasts starkly (and negatively) with relative 
stability in NGOs. Sobolev said frequent turnover limits institutional knowledge because 
important information is not retained, thereby lessening key decision-making and 
problem-solving capacities in the public sector. 
 
Sobolev said one problematic outcome was that government contracts for service 
providers were not ready by October 2007, when the Global Fund grant ended. He 
claimed NIHD had previously given his NGO and others only an “informal” explanation 
as to what the process would entail, neglecting to formally disclose information regarding 
agreements and contracts. Therefore, he said, “We didn’t know until January 2008 what 
                                                 
21 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
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we’d have for the 2008 calendar year. We didn’t know what the conditions would be. We 
didn’t know what the rules would be. It was a mess.”22 
 
Other civil society staff interviewed in April 2008 did not share Sobolev’s view. Tatjana 
Magerova, the director of a harm reduction NGO in Narva, said she had been mostly 
pleased with the post–Global Fund transition. “I was very well informed during lead up 
and preparation to transition,” she said.23 “From the very beginning, [NIHD] said civil 
society would always continue to be funded after the Global Fund program ended, and I 
had no reason not to believe them.” Magerova said she had met with NIHD personnel 
four months before the program ended, and was told then that her organization would be 
funded in 2008.24 Another NGO implementer, Irina Moroz from Life Is Going On 
(LIGO), concurred with Magerova. Moroz said she knew well in advance of the 
transition period that funding would continue, and at current levels, for her organization’s 
work.25 
 
Public-sector perspective  
 
Annike Veimer, the former Global Fund program manager, said that both she and other 
government agencies took sufficient steps to ensure a relatively smooth transfer. She 
noted, for example, that the government had decided to pick up the full cost of procuring 
ARVs by 2006, one year before the Global Fund program ended. Previously the Global 
Fund and the government had shared procurement responsibility. Government authorities 
made that decision because they wanted to be absolutely certain they had the necessary 
capacity and expertise to oversee all aspects of procurement. 
 
The WHO’s Habicht said he also believed the Estonian government had prepared 
adequately for the transition—and had adequately informed its civil society partners. He 
noted that the Governmental Commission on HIV/AIDS was established in 2005, a full 
two years before the Global Fund program ended (see Box A). One primary objective of 
that Commission, he said, was to replace the CCM as the main multisectoral HIV/AIDS 
policy body in Estonia. The Commission always has included civil society 
representatives, he said, as did the CCM.  
 
Habicht said that flow charts outlining government ministries’ responsibilities vis-à-vis 
HIV/AIDS services had been prepared well in advance of the transition and distributed to 
civil society partners. Those flow charts made it clear, he said, that a cross-government 
structure had been devised, with different ministries assigned different responsibilities. 
 
According to Habicht, the root of the problem was that some civil society groups never 
truly understood the new post–Global Fund structure even after it was explained to them 
                                                 
22 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
23 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
24 Magerova said she mostly “got what she wanted” in the first contract she signed with NIHD for post–
Global Fund services. She added that if other organizations are complaining, “I think it’s probably their 
fault for not having done appropriate and extensive background work” as the transition date was 
approaching. 
25 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 25, 2008. 
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prior to the transition. Moreover, he said, they opposed nearly all proposed changes—
even those that were clearly beneficial for sustainability because they would have helped 
build capacity in advance.  
 
Habicht, a member of the CCM, gave the following example. He said that in the wake of 
the Global Fund’s mid-term review (in 2005), several CCM members had proposed 
having ministries begin gradually taking responsibility for program management prior to 
the official end. He said that proposal was opposed by civil society representatives on the 
CCM. The reason for opposition from the NGOs, he said, was that they were used to 
signing one contract only (with the Global Fund). They did not want to face what they 
perceived as the unnecessary hassle of dealing with different ministries depending on 
what services they provided. Habicht added that the NGOs’ preferred option—to not 
allow ministries to assume responsibilities in advance—was also favored by some 
ministry officials, who did not want to assume responsibility for HIV/AIDS programs or 
allocate funds earlier than anticipated.  
 
Ultimately the civil society contingent prevailed and the proposal was voted down by the 
CCM. In Habicht’s view, the decision to not transfer some Global Fund oversight and 
funding responsibilities in advance was a lost opportunity to build critical capacity within 
the public sector. 
 
4.3. Lack of consistency and coordination among government agencies regarding 
HIV/AIDS service responsibilities 
 
As noted previously, HIV/AIDS programs and services that were once organized under 
one system (the Global Fund) are now the responsibility of different government agencies 
(see Box A). Since taking over, however, the agencies have operated at different levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness. They also do not follow the same procedures and strategies 
in everything from contracts to implementation oversight, even though the National 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Strategy 2006–2015, which sets broad guidelines for all 
stakeholders to follow, is supposed to ensure consistency. Stakeholders from across the 
spectrum agree that this ongoing challenge is particularly frustrating and problematic. 
 
Support commitments  
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs has given written commitments to all its service-delivery 
partners, most of which are NGOs, that it will support their work for five years. Separate 
agreements must be signed annually to determine specific funding levels and service 
priorities, but civil society partners are nonetheless extremely pleased with the longer-
term guarantees. They help reduce the usually persistent pressure on implementers 
regarding how (or if) to plan for more than just the short term. Many NGOs view such 
developments as greatly improving their ability to provide better and more effective 
services because they are less distracted by concerns over sustainability. 
 
Other agencies, including the Ministries of Justice and Education, have not extended such 
commitments to implementing partners.  
16 
 
Lingering gap in school-based HIV education  
 
The Ministry of Education has responsibility for crucial HIV prevention and education 
projects in the country’s schools. Ministry officials decided to discontinue a Global 
Fund–supported program in which specially trained adult HIV educators visited schools 
and discussed HIV, STIs and other health issues with students directly. Officials said they 
preferred to incorporate such information and education directly into a new national 
curriculum. Regardless of the ultimate merits of their plan, the fact remains that they 
stopped what by all respects was a useful and important initiative before the new 
curriculum was ready. As of April 2008, school-based HIV education programs had not 
been provided for several months. The ministry reportedly has resisted entreaties to 
reinstate the specially trained educators even on an interim basis, at least until the new 
curriculum is available. It claims it does not have the funds to pay the specialists for even 
just a few months. 
 
The education ministry has been criticized repeatedly for being short-sighted and risking 
the health of Estonian students. From the government side, Merilin Mäesalu, a chief 
specialist in MoSA’s Public Health Department, accused the Ministry of Education of 
being “the main bottleneck” to an effective post–Global Fund transition. She said, “We 
say that we can’t wait. We must solve this problem. We’re trying to do so by convincing 
them that it is important to fill the continuing gap.”26 
 
On the civil society side, Nelli Kallikova from the AIDS Support Center said the 
ministry’s actions are particularly outrageous because the HIV epidemic is generalizing, 
and that school-age girls greatly need improved and consistent access to HIV prevention 
education. She said, “We’re seeing that young women and girls comprise larger shares of 
new cases. Now, for example, more women than men between the ages of 15 and 19 are 
HIV-positive.”27  
 
The ESPO Society’s Slava Vassiljev, one of the civil society representatives on the 
national AIDS commission, said that representatives from both the Ministries of 
Education and Justice—which also has been criticized for its slow pace in implementing 
its new HIV-related responsibilities—had faced tough questions during a recent 
commission meeting. “Unfortunately,” he said, “mid-level bureaucrats hemmed and 
hawed, and didn’t really have satisfactory responses as to why they were not moving 
forward more appropriately and aggressively.”28 
 
MoSA’s Mäesalu added that it appeared the Ministry of Justice at least was recognizing 
the problem.29 She said the agency had recently hired a new contact person on 
HIV/AIDS, a development that raised hopes of more rapid and comprehensive 
implementation of the ministry’s responsibilities. 
                                                 
26 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
27 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
28 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 25, 2008. 
29 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
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4.4 Restrictive contracts 
 
A representative from Convictus Eesti, an NGO that has worked extensively in prisons 
over the past several years, reported that he and his organization were upset by various 
restrictions added to its first post–Global Fund contract, which it signed with the Ministry 
of Justice.  
 
Latsin Alijev said he was initially “pleasantly surprised” because the new contract 
allocates a bit more money than the NGO had received through the Global Fund 
program.30 He added, though, that it contains language specifically stating that the 
ministry can “change the agreement” at any time, and for any reason. That raises the 
possibility that the ministry could arbitrarily, and suddenly, decrease funding or even 
alter terms if authorities are displeased.  
 
Alijev also said he and his colleagues were concerned because the new agreement does 
not mention several services that Convictus Eesti had long provided, such as hosting 
“information days” in prisons during which outside experts discussed health issues such 
as TB and hepatitis. The result is that the organization is now effectively limited to one 
major activity, organizing support groups for HIV-positive inmates.  
 
In Alijev’s view, the new restrictions indicate that ministry authorities “don’t understand 
the importance of our work.” He said the organization was trying to improve the situation 
with the help of NIHD, which as Global Fund PR had supported a wide range of prison-
based services. 
 
4.5 Civil society’s effectiveness and relations with the government 
 
Relations between the government and civil society appear to have been mostly collegial 
in recent years, but tensions do exist. The transition process from the Global Fund to the 
national budget has exacerbated some of those tensions and created new ones. In general, 
many public-sector respondents consider civil society to be ineffective and misguided. In 
return, some civil society respondents claim they are not properly respected by 
government or given adequate credit for the success of their direct service delivery. 
 
Government perspective  
 
According to Habicht from WHO, the civil society sector is not as effective as it should 
be in helping shape the overall HIV/AIDS response. He said their “voices have not been 
heard” to the fullest extent because they lack adequate human capacity, are poorly 
informed in some key areas, and “miss the big picture” when they focus primarily on 
specific issues.31  
 
                                                 
30 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
31 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
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He cited as an example some NGOs’ persistent claim that the Estonian ARV procurement 
process is not transparent. Habicht said that claim is easily refuted because “all the 
procurement information is available online.”  
 
In general, he said, civil society groups would be better advocates if they understood how 
government functions. That would improve their ability to identify when compromise is 
the most appropriate response and when they might successfully push harder.   
 
Habicht’s observations were similar to those reported by the authors of the WHO 
evaluation report published in April 2008:  
 
The capacity of service-providing NGOs to manage projects has improved 
significantly…[but] NGOs have made less progress in developing some of 
the other skills needed for a strong and vibrant third sector in Estonia. 
Examples of such skills include: contract negotiation, risk analysis and 
management, public fundraising, reserves planning and development, 
resource management and planning, human resource management,  
and advocacy. 
 
…[T]here are some advocacy and lobbying areas where NGOs have been 
extremely successful, e.g., in securing financial resources from the state 
budget following the end of the Global Fund grant. However, this could be 
developed further and made more systematic, by recognizing the collective 
strength of NGOs acting together, e.g., through a network focused on HIV 
and AIDS. There is still evidence of dependency in this area with, for 
example, some respondents saying that they could do nothing about the 
issue of opioid substitution therapy in arrest houses unless something 
came ‘from the top.’ Although there is an element of truth in this, in that 
policy change is likely to require joint ministerial action across the 
Ministries of Social Affairs, Justice and Interior, NGOs are well-placed to 
influence such action through lobbying and advocacy efforts.32 
 
Civil society perspective 
 
Some civil society representatives acknowledge that the sector in general may not be as 
effective as it could be. Igor Sobolev, EHPV’s chairman, said he believes the main 
problem is that civil society is rarely united33—with the successful joint advocacy effort 
in the summer of 2007, to guarantee continued national budget funding, being the 
exception that proves the rule.  
 
He added, though, that some important external barriers still exist that prevent civil 
society from achieving its full potential. In his opinion, for example, civil society is 
                                                 
32 World Health Organization, “Evaluation of Fighting HIV/AIDS in Estonia”, April 2008. Online in PDF 
format: www.euro.who.int/Document/E91264.pdf. 
33 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
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underrepresented on the Governmental Commission on HIV/AIDS, especially in 
comparison with the now-defunct Global Fund CCM.  
 
Sobolev also said that government officials far too rarely address the language issue in a 
meaningful way. A significant number of representatives of HIV/AIDS NGOs are 
Russian-speakers, which is not surprising given the epidemic’s disproportionate impact 
on members of the Russian-speaking minority. However, government policies mandate 
that most meetings be held exclusively, or nearly exclusively, in Estonian. That limits the 
ability of non-Estonian advocates to participate. 
 
Box B 
 
ONE NGO PROVIDER’S ACCOUNT OF TRANSITION TO NATIONAL BUDGET 
 
Most Estonian NGOs that served as sub-recipients of the Global Fund program have 
subsequently been supported for similar services through the national budget. Nelli Kallikova, 
the director of the AIDS Support Center, a harm reduction NGO in Tallinn, summarized some 
transition-related issues for her organization as follows: 
 
Process: “Last summer [prior to the official end of the Global Fund program], we were invited 
to submit an application for continued funding to the Ministry of Social Affairs. We were 
approved for the same amount (for one year) as in our last Global Fund contract. We didn’t 
ask for additional funds at the time for two reasons. For one thing, we were uncertain as to 
whether doing so would damage our chances of getting a new contract. Also, I realized that 
additional funds would lead to additional services, and that I would need more staff to provide 
them. That would be complicated, at least in the short term, because it can take a long time to 
train people.”   
 
Number of clients: “The number of clients hasn’t changed. For example, we used Global 
Fund money to put 120 people on methadone….and we’re still able to provide that service to 
the same number of people, funded through the national budget.” 
 
Guarantee of support. “Until this year, all of our contracts [through the Global Fund] were 
for just one year only. That made things difficult in many ways because it’s hard to plan for 
the longer-term, especially when the bulk of funding is from that one source. Now, though, 
NIHD [the National Institute of Health Development] has formally committed to supporting 
us for five years. We don’t know the exact amount we’ll receive each year—and we still need 
to apply for specific funding on an annual basis—but we do have a guarantee of support for 
five years in writing. This is good development for us and an important expression of good 
will. Other public-sector funders have copied NIHD’s strategy. For example, we also received 
a formal guarantee of five years’ support from the city government, which gives us some 
funds as well. 
 
4.6 Care and services for prisoners 
 
At any given time, HIV prevalence among prisoners in Estonia is several times higher 
than among the general population. That is not unexpected in light of two linked facts—
that IDUs continue to comprise the majority of all the nation’s HIV cases and that drug 
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users are incarcerated far more commonly than any other group. Veimer estimated in 
April 2008 that about 500 of the nation’s 4,000 prisoners were HIV-positive, which 
constitutes more than 12 percent of the total inmate population.34 
 
Government and civil society sources listed several challenges in providing 
comprehensive and effective HIV treatment and prevention services to inmates. The 
major one is that all prison-related services, including health care, are the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Justice. It is required to comply with national treatment guidelines and 
standards in its parallel health system; however, observers contend that the overall level 
of care lags behind what is available outside. 
 
ART access does not appear to be a problem. More than 100 inmates were on ART, 
according to Veimer, in April 2008—which means that prisoners comprise nearly 20 
percent of people receiving ART across the country. However, the ministry’s policies and 
record regarding HIV prevention are patchier. It allows NGOs to distribute condoms to 
inmates, but bars the provision of clean needles and syringes within its facilities.35 
Veimer said that access to methadone for substitution treatment purposes has been 
inconsistent, varying not only among different facilities but within individual ones as 
well. She said she had heard reports of inmates receiving methadone for several weeks 
and then suddenly being denied access for no apparent reason.36 
 
Yet another challenge is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs also has certain criminal 
justice responsibilities, notably its oversight of pre-trial detention. ART is available to 
individuals awaiting trial, but methadone and other harm reduction services are not. The 
lack of coordination and consistency among different agencies is dangerous to detainees’ 
individual health and well-being and can have even greater public health consequences in 
terms the overall HIV epidemic. 
 
4.7 Lack of generic ARVs 
 
As noted previously, increasing ART uptake will have serious financial consequences for 
the national budget. This challenge is much greater in Estonia than in many other 
countries, including some with higher disease burden, because only brand-name ARVs 
are currently available in the country.  
 
A data review conducted in early 2008 showed wide variations in ARV purchase 
prices,37 from the equivalent of $746.52 per patient per year for Merck’s Stocrin 
(efavirenz) to $11,083.92 per patient per year for Gilead’s Truvada (emtricitabine + 
tenofovir). Prices paid by the Estonian government for other ARV products commonly 
                                                 
34 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
35 Latsin Alijev from Convictus Eesti, an NGO that provides HIV-related services in prisons, said he sees 
little indication that the Ministry of Justice will change this policy in the near future. Ministry officials 
regularly point to a national law explicitly forbidding the use of alcohol and drugs in prisons; inmates often 
get longer sentences if found to be intoxicated. Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
36 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
37 The specific information regarding ARV prices in Estonia was provided to the author in April 2008 by 
members of a research team conducting a regional review of ARV pricing and access. 
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used worldwide included $3,550.44 per person per year for GlaxoSmithKline’s Combivi
(zidovudine + lamivudine) and $7,195.44 for Abbott’s Kaletra (lopina
r 
vir/ritonavir). 
                                                
 
About 85 percent of patients currently on ART in Estonia are on one of two regimens. 
Assuming Combivir is used, the cost to the government per patient per year for those 
regimens is as follows (not including sales tax): 
• Combivir (zidovudine + lamivudine) + Stocrin (efavirenz) = $4,296.96 
• Combivir (zidovudine + lamivudine) + Kaletra (lopinavir/ritonavir) = $10,745.88 
 
It is not difficult to see how such prices can cause concern among budget managers. It is 
also true that generic versions of all ARVs provided in Estonia are used in other parts of 
the world; such versions can be as much as 90 percent cheaper.  
 
In theory at least, Estonia could follow the lead of many other countries, including 
Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa, and take more aggressive—but perfectly legal, as per 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)—steps to lower its ARV purchasing costs. For 
example, Estonian law specifically allows the use of parallel importation, one so-called 
flexibility that WTO signatories are permitted to exercise to lower the cost of ARVs and 
other essential medicines.38  
 
As of April 2008, however, the government had not exercised that legal right in regards 
to ARVs. Among other things, Estonian authorities are constrained by relatively rigid EU 
patent-protection policies. According to the WHO’s Jarno Habicht, the Estonian 
government is not willing to risk antagonizing other EU members by seeking to utilize 
TRIPS flexibilities to lower ARV costs. In their view, he said, Estonia is “not big 
enough” to declare a public health emergency39—a TRIPS-permitted step under which 
other countries have justified strategies to procure lower-priced ARVs. 
 
Habicht said that few other options are immediately available, noting that the drug 
companies are not likely to lower prices voluntarily when there is no pressure for them to 
do so.  
 
Unlike in many other countries, local NGOs and PLHA in Estonia have not made access 
to generic ARVs a major advocacy priority. That stems from a persistent belief that 
generic medicines are less effective and not as safe as brand-name drugs, even among 
individuals who have worked on HIV treatment and prevention issues for many years. 
The comments of one HIV-positive leader of an HIV/AIDS NGO illustrate the mindset: 
“Thank God no generics! We think that brands mean quality. We are afraid to use or 
consider using drugs from places like India.”40 
 
4.8 Problem and priority areas in regards to services scale-up 
 
 
38 Parallel importation and other “flexibilities” are outlined in the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.  
39 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
40 Interview with Slava Vassiljev from ESPO Society in Tallinn, April 25, 2008.  
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There is nearly universal agreement that the Global Fund program greatly improved 
Estonia’s HIV/AIDS response. Numerous challenges nevertheless remain. For one thing, 
much more needs to be done in certain key prevention and treatment areas that have long 
been priorities; at the same time, the rapidly changing nature of the epidemic means new 
priorities are regularly identified and demand attention.  
  
HIV testing 
 
Annike Veimer from NIHD said in April 2008 that a total of six public-sector VCT sites 
were operational.41 Express tests have only just become available, she added, and the 
department hoped to make them available at all sites by the end of the year. Scaling up 
the availability of express tests should, in her opinion, increase testing uptake because it 
will be far less likely that patients will choose not to learn their test results.   
 
HIV-related stigma and discrimination 
 
All respondents agreed that HIV-related stigma and discrimination remain major barriers 
to uptake of care and treatment services among those living with HIV and members of 
vulnerable populations. Veimer said she believed stigma was lessening, however, at least 
in part because of the expanded availability of ART. Other important steps, she said, 
included recent media awareness campaigns and the increasing number of private 
companies that hold HIV/AIDS training seminars for employees.  
 
Veimer gave a specific example illustrating the lingering effect of stigmatizing attitudes 
among many Estonians.42 In recent years, she said, a handful of communities have 
resisted low-threshold facilities serving IDUs. In July 2006, members of one 
neighborhood in Tallinn filed suit in court to stop the city from establishing such a 
facility in their community. A settlement was finally reached a year later; although on-
site needle and syringe exchange was banned, the site’s organizers are permitted to 
provide mobile-based exchange services. (Veimer added that she and her colleagues were 
pleased that no legal precedent was created for closing down such services in general.) 
 
Far too many HIV-positive individuals are not aware of their status 
 
As a result, they are not receiving adequate medical care, including ART, or potentially 
useful social support. Veimer said the most persistent challenge is that people “present 
too late for care…often when they are already clinically ill with AIDS.”43 She said the 
reasons for their delays vary, but she believed that most either do not know about existing 
services or are afraid to access them because of stigma and confidentiality concerns. The 
first reason points to the need for more comprehensive outreach and awareness efforts, 
especially among members of vulnerable populations, and the second reinforces the need 
for improved anti-stigma activities. 
 
                                                 
41 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
42 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
43 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
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Both government and civil society informants agree that substandard healthcare uptake 
among HIV-positive IDUs represents the biggest current problem in this regard. A recent 
WHO evaluation of Estonia’s HIV/AIDS response concluded the following:  
 
Coverage of ART among HIV-positive IDUs appears to be low. For 
example, although the vast majority of all HIV infections in Estonia have 
been among IDUs, only 30 to 35 percent of those receiving ART in Narva 
are reported to be IDUs. The problem does not seem to relate to access to 
HIV testing. Coverage of HIV testing among IDUs appears to be good. 
For example, in 2005, more than two thirds of IDUs (68 percent) reported 
having had an HIV test in the last year. However, relatively few of these 
then attend for medical services.44 
 
Limited case management  
 
Both Veimer and Merilin Mäesalu (from MoSA) highlighted the lack of a viable case 
management system in Estonia. What this means in practice is that, for example, 
continuity of care for HIV-positive individuals and people on substitution treatment 
rarely exists when they move in and out of prison. Such an omission can have severe 
health impacts, especially if ART access and adherence are affected. Discontinuation of 
access to substitution treatment greatly increases the possibility that a client will revert to 
injecting drugs and face all the attendant health risks such behavior entails. 
 
Improved case management could also prove beneficial to IDUs, who often fall through 
the cracks in terms of comprehensive and affordable care. Many, if not most, do not have 
health insurance. Moreover, as noted in a recent WHO evaluation, they are likely to 
“require a range of services, e.g. ART, TB and STI treatment and opioid substitution 
therapy [substitution treatment], which are still provided in an isolated way by different 
organizations in different places.”45 
 
According to Mäesalu, MoSA policymakers are currently developing a case management 
system that will be fully launched over the next two years.46 
 
                                                 
44 World Health Organization, “Evaluation of Fighting HIV/AIDS in Estonia”, April 2008. Online in PDF 
format: www.euro.who.int/Document/E91264.pdf. 
45 World Health Organization, “Evaluation of Fighting HIV/AIDS in Estonia”, April 2008. Online in PDF 
format: www.euro.who.int/Document/E91264.pdf. 
46 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 22, 2008. 
24 
5. Lessons learned and recommendations 
 
The ongoing challenges related to the post–Global Fund transition, summarized in 
Section 4, should not obscure the fact that ART access continues to increase in Estonia. 
So too does access to other crucial HIV/AIDS services provided by the government and 
its civil society partners.  
 
The process has not been easy or smooth, however. Significant obstacles remain as well, 
most notably in regards to:  
• ensuring stability and increases in budget support;  
• increasing uptake of ART and other HIV treatment services, especially among 
IDUs;   
• improving coordination among—and the quality and scope of services provided 
by—all government ministries; and 
• improving communication between civil society and government in order to 
reduce misconceptions and clarify policies and strategies. 
 
Much of what has been done (and still must be done) in Estonia is context-specific. That 
is especially true in light of the country’s relative wealth, small absolute number of HIV 
cases, and drug use–driven epidemic. That said, Global Fund programs will one day end 
or decline in importance even in relatively poor countries with millions of PLHA who 
contracted HIV through heterosexual sex. Some of the most basic lessons learned from 
recent developments in Estonia are likely to be relevant there as well 
 
The following is a hybrid list of lessons learned and recommendations. Some are general 
and others specific; each, though, is designed to improve access to HIV/AIDS services 
for those in need. That overarching objective should be the basis of decisions made and 
policies adopted throughout the world. 
 
The recommendations are aimed primarily at governments because of the public sector’s 
leading role in designing, implementing and sustaining Global Fund programs. 
 
1. One national strategy should be developed and approved at least a year in 
advance of an impending post–Global Fund transition. All stakeholders from 
across the government and civil society should be invited to participate in the 
development of this single, comprehensive strategy. If they are excluded, they 
may not understand or accept it; as a result, the quality of service provision could 
suffer, as could cooperation and coordination. 
 
2. All stakeholders (and especially the government) should recognize the long-
term nature of their commitment. When HIV/AIDS strategic plans stretch over 
several years—Estonia’s current one extends for 10 years, for example—it is 
easier to lock in resources and engender ongoing financial, social, and political 
support. Certainly plans can be altered if needed, but the overall frameworks of a 
long-term strategic plan should remain solid. 
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3. Start planning for the end of the Global Fund program on the day it begins. 
It may seem as though Global Fund assistance will always be available. After all, 
most individual programs last five years, and often multiple programs may be 
operating in one country on an overlapping basis. There are no guarantees, 
however, especially with the Global Fund dependent on support from wealthier 
nations whose political and economic situations fluctuate regularly.  
 
Policymakers in-country should develop plans in preparation for the end of each 
individual Global Fund program. In doing so, they should consider ways to 
maintain and expand funding for Global Fund–initiated projects and services and 
to continue capacity-building initiatives. Many countries, particularly those with 
high disease burdens and limited resources, might find replacement donor support 
to be the most affordable and appropriate option; if so, they should begin 
negotiating with bilateral donors and/or multilateral institutions from day one of 
the Global Fund program. Special grants and loans from those sources could be 
secured to cover the costs of sustaining and expanding Global Fund programs 
once they officially end.   
 
4. A transparent and effective M&E (monitoring and evaluation) structure 
should be created at the national level. It is absolutely vital for all policymakers 
and stakeholders to know where HIV/AIDS funds are going, who or what is using 
them, how they are used, and whether they have been effective in achieving pre-
determined goals. Public trust in and support for HIV/AIDS programs will decline 
if M&E is substandard or opaque (or both). Even the appearance of corruption is 
unacceptable. Regular audits should be conducted and reviewed by independent 
sources and then made available for public scrutiny, i.e., on government websites.  
 
5. Some flexibility should be built into transition plans so as to ensure 
cooperation, coordination, and consistent service delivery. In Estonia, for 
example, the government agreed to allocate funds to cover a three-month gap 
between the official end of the Global Fund program and the beginning of the 
fiscal year. This eliminated the possibility that service providers would need to 
suspend activities for those in need. Similarly, NIHD offered its NGO partners 
formal cooperation agreements extending over five years. That gesture was 
greatly appreciated because it signified the government’s trust in its partners’ 
activities and assured medium-term sustainability. 
 
6. Officials in all government agencies, including finance ministers and trade 
and health policymakers, should be made aware of the economic and social 
benefits to societies overall of comprehensive HIV/AIDS programs. Countries 
are wealthier, more productive and more hopeful when all in need have access to 
ART and other life-prolonging and health-maintaining medicines. Making 
HIV/AIDS services a key budget priority is not money wasted or better used 
elsewhere.   
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7. More aggressive and targeted advocacy should be directed at key 
multilateral institutions that focus extensively on reduced public spending. 
Maintaining and expanding HIV/AIDS programs requires vast amounts of public 
spending. In some countries, however, agreements with the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund mandate reductions in public expenditures, 
including for the health sector. With the support of international and local civil 
society advocates, government officials (especially finance ministers) should step 
up and maintain pressure on such institutions to relax the public-sector spending 
caps that are conditions of loans and other economic plans implemented with the 
aid of these organizations. Public spending cannot and should not be reduced 
during health crises; instead, ways should be explored to expand it. 
 
8. Government policymakers should be as open as possible to strategies and 
policies used elsewhere to respond to HIV epidemics. For example, in recent 
years Estonia has accepted and embraced harm reduction as a core HIV 
prevention strategy. Health officials were initially hesitant, but changed their 
minds after carefully reviewing scientific evidence about and projects providing 
needle exchange and substitution treatment. Such initiatives are now integral parts 
of the country’s HIV prevention efforts. 
 
9. Government officials and civil society partners should always seek ways to 
increase availability of generic drugs. Some countries have been quite 
successful in using global trade policies and rules to dramatically reduce the cost 
of ARVs and other essential medicines. In most cases, the reductions have 
occurred either because generic drugs actually have been introduced or because 
manufacturers of brand-name drugs lower prices because they believe there is a 
real likelihood of their introduction.  
 
In Estonia, meanwhile, the government continues to purchase only brand-name 
ARVs at premium prices. It is lucky it can afford such outlays at the moment, but 
sustainability could be threatened as more and more people receive ART. The 
government, in concert with civil society, should be much more aggressive in 
directly challenging EU policies that greatly limit member-states’ ability to lower 
such crucial healthcare costs. For example, one of the specific commitments of 
the 2007 Bremen Declaration was for European nations to “cooperate to ensure 
access to affordable medication.”47 Rigid patent-protection policies and 
limitations on generic medicines seem to violate both the letter and spirit of that 
commitment. After all, it would seem that improving access to generics would be 
one of the easiest ways for members to ensure access to affordable medicines. 
 
10. Meanwhile, health authorities, in partnership with civil society, should 
initiate awareness and education campaigns about generic ARVs. This 
                                                 
47 The Bremen Declaration on Responsibility and Partnership—Together Against HIV/AIDS was agreed to 
in March 2007. Those gathered included the ‘Ministers and representatives of Governments from the 
European Union and neighbouring countries responsible for health’. More information is available online 
in PDF format: www.eu2007.de/en/News/download_docs/Maerz/0312-BSGV/070Bremen.pdf. 
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recommendation is relevant in countries such as Estonia where many PLHA 
and/or healthcare personnel remain suspicious about the quality and effectiveness 
of generic ARVs in general. Their suspicions are not based on fact, however: 
generic ARVs are used regularly and safely around the world.  
 
The government’s efforts in this behalf are only likely to be successful if it can 
demonstrate that its drug-regulatory practices and policies are sound. This may 
require inviting monitors from WHO and other respected international entities to 
conduct thorough reviews on a regular basis and to issue appropriate reports as to 
national authorities’ ability to ensure uniform quality of all medicines, both brand-
names and generics. Such a step would greatly increase the potential success of 
awareness and education campaigns regarding the use of generics. 
 
Equally important is the fact that generics are far less expensive than their brand-
name counterparts. The campaigns should stress the fact that if generics were 
available, more people could be put on ART for the same amount of money. This 
would reduce pressure on the national budget and help ensure sustainability of 
HIV treatment programs.  
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Appendix 1. Civil society’s 2007 public appeal on HIV/AIDS funding allocations  
 
In June 2007, the government announced that it could not afford to maintain the Global 
Fund program’s level of funding for HIV/AIDS programs. That announcement implied 
that funding for ART provision would be cut, thereby reducing the number of people 
with access to the vital medicines. 
 
In response, a coalition of 17 Estonian NGOs drafted a public appeal and submitted it to 
the government.48 Representatives from some 100 civil society groups in 35 other 
countries signed a separate document supporting their Estonian counterparts’ initiative.  
 
Their efforts were successful. In October 2007, the Minister of Social Affairs announced 
that overall funding for HIV/AIDS programs in the 2008 budget, which began in January 
2008, would not be reduced. The coordinated action by civil society groups was an 
important step toward re-asserting their vital role as partners with government in the 
post–Global Fund era. 
 
The text of the Estonian civil society groups’ public appeal is reprinted verbatim below 
(translated into English): 
 
From the organizations struggling against HIV and AIDS and communities of 
people living with HIV. 
 
PUBLIC APPEAL: On the 20th June 2007 an article appeared in the media concerning 
the Estonian government’s plans to reduce the funding allocations for 2008 for the care, 
treatment and support of people living with HIV and AIDS. The result of this action 
would be to reduce the commitment to HIV services up to seven times less than had been 
previously planned. It was said that the resources should be allotted to other social areas 
such as children's homes, disability services and emergency workers.  
 
Participants of the NGO advocacy seminar, where different organizations struggling 
against HIV/AIDS took part, agreed to address a public appeal to the state and political 
leaders, and to appeal to all organizations and individuals who are concerned about 
HIV/AIDS, who do realize how many lives we will lose through decisions that are ill-
advised, fail to recognize the danger to society from HIV and AIDS and pay too little 
attention to the experience of other countries in responding to HIV and AIDS.  
 
The reduction of money resources for treatment leaves hundred of young people to the 
mercy of fate and insouciant contrasting of different social groups, who need social help, 
and only intensifies the present stigma and discrimination of living with HIV.  
 
We would like to remind the government of some facts:  
 
                                                 
48 See 
www.worldaidscampaign.info/index.php/en/campaigns/in_country_campaigns/europe/estonia_a_budget_fr
eeze_aimed_at_social_needs_for_2008. 
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• The strategy has been approved by the government concerning the fight against 
HIV/AIDS for the years of 2006–2015, and the state operation program of the 
strategy above for 200-2009 [sic], that is why the full responsibility for financing 
the program rests with the state. 
• During the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations 
Organizations on HIV/AIDS in 2001 Estonia together with the other members of 
UNO approved the Declaration concerning the adherence to the struggle with 
HIV/AIDS, under which access to treatment must be guaranteed. Everyone has a 
right to treatment.  
• The Minister of Social Affairs gave a promise on February 23, 2007 to the 
representative of the Global Fund, which is involved in the response to fight the 
diseases of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, to continue financing treatment 
at the same level, once the Global Fund stops its financing. 
 
Continuous treatment is not only a requirement for the effective management of HIV and 
AIDS, it also improves the quality of lives for people living with HIV and gives them an 
opportunity to be a full member of the community and a tax-payer. Continuous treatment 
prevents the possibility of the appearance of the resistant forms of the virus and its 
spread.  
 
This disease that especially affects our young people threatens our future state, 
population growth and national security. The qualitative, consistent and preventive work 
gives an opportunity to secure people from the further spreading of the virus and our 
nation’s downfall.  
 
Estonia, as a member of the European Union with the highest number of new detected 
infections, is not entitled to abandon its responsibilities to realize and to expand the 
preventive work and to secure anti-virus treatment to all indigent people living with HIV-
AIDS.  
 
The reduction of financing now will lead to repeated and increased expenses from all 
parts of the community in the future.  
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Appendix 2. Key HIV prevention challenge: Lagging uptake and access to 
substitution treatment 
 
Given that Estonia’s HIV epidemic is largely drug use–related, it is not surprising that 
one of the six main objectives of the Global Fund program centered on HIV prevention 
and care services for injecting drug users (IDUs). The harm reduction philosophy greatly 
influenced interventions, which included syringe and needle distribution and ramping up 
substitution treatment. Over the program’s four years, nearly 4.5 million syringes were 
distributed to IDUs; nearly 11,000 new clients visited needle/syringe exchange sites; and 
some 4,400 clients were officially registered in exchange programs49.  
 
Not all of the targets were met, however, even though the volume of services increased 
substantially. In terms of needle and syringe provision, at least 80 percent of each target 
indicator was met (and some even exceeded plans). The program lagged more 
significantly in regards to substitution treatment: by the end of the program, a total of 654 
IDUs were receiving methadone in Estonia, which represented 78 percent of the target 
(840 people)50. 
 
That failure highlights a major challenge in HIV/AIDS service delivery for both the 
government and its civil society partners. The government has committed to increasing 
access to harm reduction services in the post–Global Fund era, and policymakers 
recognize that successful HIV prevention efforts require greatly increased uptake of 
substitution treatment.  
 
According to Annike Veimer, director of public health programs at the National Institute 
of Health Development (NIHD), there were an estimated 14,000 IDUs in Estonia in April 
200851. “We should have at least 4,000 of them on substitution treatment” to meet WHO 
recommendations, she said, but only “about 750” were receiving methadone52. 
 
Veimer said one reason for the low uptake was that members of the Russian-speaking 
population, who comprise the majority of IDUs, were “distrustful” of methadone. “They 
hear bad things about it in the Russia-based media,” she said. (Methadone is banned for 
any purpose in Russia.) Another issue she cited is that “maybe 50 percent” of IDUs now 
inject ephedrine-based compounds (such as amphetamines) instead of or in addition to 
opiates. Methadone and similar medicines used in substitution treatment are effective 
only against opiates. 
 
                                                 
49 National Institute of Health Development, “Estonian Program of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria”. Evaluation published December 2007.  
50 National Institute of Health Development, “Estonian Program of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria”. Evaluation published December 2007.  
51 All comments attributed to Veimer in this section were obtained during an interview in Tallinn on April 
21, 2008.  
52 Of those 750, about 605 were receiving methadone through the state budget, according to Veimer. The 
rest were enrolled in private clinics.  
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Veimer acknowledged that the third reason had more to do with limited public-sector 
capacity to treat drug dependence. She said, “At the end of the Soviet era, we abolished 
narcological centers because we didn’t like that model. But we didn’t replace them with 
anything.” As a result, she said, drug-treatment options (including detoxification and 
rehabilitation) are limited in Estonia.  
 
The capacity limitation issue was echoed by the director of one of the few harm reduction 
NGOs in Estonia. According to Nelli Kallikova of the AIDS Support Center, “Even 
though there are 4,000 IDUs in Tallinn, there are less than 300 [substitution treatment] 
slots. I believe it’s criminal that we promise methadone and then can’t deliver” to those 
who want it53.  
 
Veimer also noted that integration had been limited to date among different agencies 
providing substitution treatment. Most notably, methadone is currently provided in 
Estonian prisons through the Ministry of Justice (even though needle and syringe 
exchange remains barred). However, there is no system in place to help ensure 
substitution treatment continuity for clients moving in and out of penitentiary facilities, 
i.e., from one jurisdiction (the justice or social affairs ministry) to another. The situation 
is even more complicated because individuals held in pre-trial detention are under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which does not provide methadone at 
any of its facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Interviewed in Tallinn, April 21, 2008. 
